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ABSTRACT
Machine Learning (ML) models are applied in a variety of tasks
such as network intrusion detection or malware classification. Yet,
these models are vulnerable to a class of malicious inputs known
as adversarial examples. These are slightly perturbed inputs that
are classified incorrectly by the ML model. The mitigation of these
adversarial inputs remains an open problem.
As a step towards understanding adversarial examples, we show
that they are not drawn from the same distribution than the original
data, and can thus be detected using statistical tests. Using this
knowledge, we introduce a complimentary approach to identify
specific inputs that are adversarial. Specifically, we augment our
ML model with an additional output, in which the model is trained
to classify all adversarial inputs.
We evaluate our approach1 on multiple adversarial example
crafting methods (including the fast gradient sign and saliency map
methods) with several datasets. The statistical test flags sample sets
containing adversarial inputs confidently at sample sizes between
10 and 100 data points. Furthermore, our augmented model either
detects adversarial examples as outliers with high accuracy (>
80%) or increases the adversary’s cost—the perturbation added—by
more than 150%. In this way, we show that statistical properties of
adversarial examples are essential to their detection.2
1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning algorithms are usually designed under the as-
sumption that models are trained on samples drawn from a distri-
bution that is representative of test samples for which they will
later make predictions—ideally, the training and test distributions
should be identical. However, this does not hold in the presence
of adversaries. A motivated adversary may either manipulate the
training [4] or test [33] distribution of a ML system. This has severe
consequences when ML is applied to security-critical problems.
Attacks are increasingly elaborate, as demonstrated by the vari-
ety of strategies available to evade malware detection built with
ML [33, 37].
Often, adversaries construct their attack inputs from a benignML
input. For instance, the feature vector of a malware—correctly classi-
fied by a ML model as malware—can be modified into a new feature
vector, the adversarial example, that is classified as benign [14, 37].
Defenses proposed to mitigate adversarial examples, such as ad-
versarial training [11] and defensive distillation [29], all fail to adapt
to changes in the attack strategy. They both make it harder for the
adversary to craft adversarial examples using existing techniques
1Please contact the authors to obtain the code for reproduction of the experiments.
2Recent work [8], however, has shown that our approach is vulnerable if optimization-
based attacks are used, which require however more computational effort.
only, thus creating an arms race [7, 25]. However, we argue that
this arms race is not inevitable: by definition, adversarial examples
must exhibit some statistical differences with the legitimate data
on which ML models perform well.
Hence, we develop in this work a countermeasure that uses the
distinguishability of adversarial examples with respect to the ex-
pected data distribution. We use statistical testing to evaluate the
hypothesis that adversarial examples, crafted to evade a ML model,
are outside of the training distribution. We show that the hypoth-
esis holds on diverse datasets [1, 2, 19] and adversarial example
algorithms [11, 26, 27].
However, this test needs to be presented with a sufficiently large
sample set of suspicious inputs—as its confidence diminishes with
the number of malicious inputs in the sample set. Therefore, we
propose a second complimentary mechanism for detecting indi-
vidual adversarial examples. The idea also exploits the statistical
distinguishibility of adversarial examples to design an outlier detec-
tion system, but this time it is directly integrated in the ML model.
Indeed, we show that models can be augmented with an additional
output reserved for adversarial examples—in essence training the
model with adversarial examples as their own class. The model,
trained to map all adversarial inputs to the added output, exhibits
robustness to adversaries.
Our contributions are the following:
Statistical Test—In Section 5, we employ a statistical test to distin-
guish adversarial examples from the model’s training data. Among
tests proposed in the literature, we select the kernel-based two-
sample test introduced by Gretton et al. [13]. This test has the key
benefit of being model-agnostic; because its kernel allows us to
apply the test directly on samples from the ML model’s input data.
We demonstrate the good performance of this test on three
datasets: MNIST (hand-written digits), DREBIN (Android malware)
andMicroRNA (medical data). Specifically, we show that the test can
confidently detect samples of 50 adversarial inputs when they differ
from the expected dataset distribution. Results are consistent across
multiple generation techniques for adversarial examples, including
the fast gradient sign method [11] and the Jacobian-based saliency
map approach [27].
IntegratedOutlierDetection—As the statistical test’s confidence
diminishes when it is presented with increasingly small sample
sets of adversarial inputs, we propose another outlier detection
system. We add an additional class to the model’s output, and train
the model to recognize adversarial examples as part of this new
class. The intuition behind the idea is the same (detect adversarial
examples using their statistical properties) but this approach allows
the defender to detect individual adversarial examples among a set
of inputs identified as malicious (by the statistical test for instance).
ar
X
iv
:1
70
2.
06
28
0v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
7 O
ct 
20
17
We observe here that adversarial examples lie in unexpected
regions of the model’s output surface because they are not rep-
resentative of the distribution. By training the model to identify
out-of-distribution inputs, one removes at least part of its error
away by filling in the things that are demonstrable (e.g., adversarial
examples).
In Section 6, we find that this approach correctly assigns adversar-
ial examples as being part of the outlier class with over 80% success
for two of the three datasets considered. For the third dataset, they
are not frequently detected but the perturbation that an adversary
needs to add to mislead the model is increased by 150%. Thus, the
cost of conducting an attack is increased in all cases. In addition,
adversarial examples that are not detected as outliers because they
are crafted with small perturbations are often correctly classified
by our augmented model: the class of the legitimate input from
which they were generated is recovered.
Arms race—We then investigate adversarial strategies taking into
account the defense deployed. For instance, black-box attacks were
previously shown to evade adversarial training and defensive distil-
lation [25]. The adversary uses an auxiliary model to find adversar-
ial inputs that are also misclassified by the defended model (because
the defended model makes adversarial crafting harder but does not
solve the model error). Our mechanisms perform well under such
black-box scenarios: adversarial inputs crafted by a black-box at-
tack are more likely to be detected than those computed directly
by an adversary with access to our model.
2 BACKGROUND
We provide here the relevant background on ML and adversarial
ML. We finally give an overview of the statistical hypothesis test
applied in this paper.
2.1 Machine Learning Classifiers
We introduce ML notation used throughout this paper. All ML
models considered are classifiers and learn a function f (x) 7→ y.
An input point or example x ∈ X is made up of n components or
features (e.g., all system level calls made by an Android application),
and y ∈ Y is a label (e.g., malware or benign). In classification
problems, the possible values of y are discrete. The output of the
model, however, is often real valued probabilities over the set of
possible labels, from which the most likely label is inferred as the
one with the largest probability.
In other words, there is an underlying and almost always un-
known distribution DCireal for each class Ci . The set of training data
X is sampled from this distribution, and the classifier approximates
this distribution during training, thereby learning DCitrain. The set
of test data Xt , used to validate the classifier’s performance, is
assumed to be drawn from the same DCireal.
Next, we present typical ML models used to solve classification
problems and studied in this paper.
Decision Trees—These models are composed of internal nodes
and leafs, whose graph makes up a tree. Each leaf is assigned one
of the possible labels, while the intermediate nodes form a path of
conditions defined using the input features. An example is classified
by finding a path of appropriate conditions from the root to one of
the leaves. Decision trees are created by successively maximizing
the information gain resulting from the choice of a condition as a
way to partition the data in two subsets (according to the value of
an input feature).
Support Vector Machines—They compute a n − 1 dimensional
hyperplane to separate the training points. Since there are infin-
itely many such hyperplanes, the one with the largest margin is
computed—yielding a convex optimization problem given the train-
ing data (X ,Y ).
Neural Networks—They are composed of small computational
units called neurons that apply an activation function to their weighted
input. Neurons are organized in interconnected layers. Depending
on the number of layers, a network is said to be shallow (single
intermediate layer) or deep (several intermediate layers). Informa-
tion is propagated through the network by having the output of a
given layer be the input of the following layer. Each of these links
is parameterized by weights. The set of model weights—or model
parameters—are trained to minimize the model’s prediction error
∥ f (x) − y∥ on a collection of known input-output pairs (X ,Y ).
Logistic regression—This linear model can be conceptualized as a
special case of neural networks without hidden layers. For problems
with two classes, the logistic function is the activation function. For
multi-class problems, it is the softmax. They are trained like neural
nets.
2.2 Adversarial Machine Learning
Adversarial ML [17], and more generally the security and privacy
of ML [28], is concerned with the study of vulnerabilities that
arise when ML is deployed in the presence of malicious individuals.
Different attack vectors are available to adversaries. They can target
ML during training [4] of the model parameters or during test
time [33] when making predictions.
In this paper, we defend against test time attacks. They target a
trained model f (_,θ ), and typically aim to find an example x ′ simi-
lar to an original example x , which is however classified differently.
To achieve this, a perturbation δ with same dimensionality as x is
computed:
f (x ′,θ ) , f (x ,θ ) where x ′ = x + δ and minδ
where δ is chosen to be minimal to prevent detection and as to
indirectly represent the attackers limitations when perturbing fea-
tures. When targeting computer vision, the perturbation must not
be detectable to the human eye. When targeting a malware detector,
the perturbation must not remove the application’s malicious be-
havior. Instead of simply having inputs classified in a wrong class,
the attacker can also target a particular class.
A typical example of such attacks is the evasion of a bayesian
spam filter, first demonstrated by Lowd et al. [22]. Malware de-
tection systems have also been targeted, as shown by Srndic et
al. [33] or Grosse et al. [14]. In addition, these adversarial inputs
are known to transfer across (i.e., to mislead) multiple models si-
multaneously [34]. This transferability property was used to create
attacks against black-box ML systems in settings where the adver-
sary has no access to the model or training data [25, 26]. A detailed
discussion of some of these attacks can be found in Section 4.
Several defenses for attacks at test time have been proposed.
For instance, training on adversarial inputs pro-actively [11] or
performing defensive distillation [29]. Both of them may fail due
to gradient masking [25]. Other approaches make use of game
theory [6, 9, 21]. However, they are computationally expensive.
2.3 Statistical Hypothesis Testing
The framework of two-sample statistical hypothesis testing was
introduced to determine whether two randomly drawn samples
originate from the same distribution.
Formally, let X ∼ p denote that sample X was drawn from a
distribution p. A statistical test can then be formalized as follows:
let X1 ∼ p, where |X1 | = n and X2 ∼ q, where |X2 | = m. The
null hypothesis H0 states that p = q. The alternative hypothesis,
HA, on the other hand, is that p , q. The statistical test T(X1,X2) :
Xn×Xm → {0, 1} takes both samples as its input and distinguishes
between H0 and HA. In particular, the p-value returned is matched
to a significance level, denoted α . The p-value is the probability that
we obtain the observed outcome or a more extreme one. α relates
to the confidence of the test, and an according threshold is fixed
before the application of the test, typically at 0.05 or 0.01. If the
p-value is smaller than the threshold, H0 is rejected. A consistent
test will reject H0 when p , q in the large sample size limit.
There are several two-sample tests for higher dimensions. For
instance, the HotellingsT 2 test evaluates whether two distributions
have the same mean [16]. Several other tests depending on graph
or tree properties of the data were proposed by Friedman et al. [10],
Rosenbaum et al. [31] or Hall et al. [15].
Most of these tests are not appropriate when considering data
with high dimensionality. This led Gretton et al. [13] to introduce a
kernel-based test. In this case, wemeasure the distance between two
probabilities (represented by samples X1 and X2). In practice, this
distance is formalized as the biased estimator of the true Maximum
Mean Discrepancy (MMD):
MMDb [F ,X1,X2] = sup
f ∈F
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
f (x1i ) − 1
m
m∑
i=1
f (x2i )
)
where the maximum indicates that we pick the kernel function f
from the function class F that maximize the difference between
the functions. Further, in contrast to other measures, we do not
need the explicit probabilities.
Gretton et al. [13] introduced several tests. We focus on one
of them in the following: a test based on the asymptotic distribu-
tion of the unbiased MMD. However, to consistently estimate the
distribution of the MMD under H0, we need to bootstrap3. Here,
bootstrapping refers to a subsampling method, where one samples
from the data available with replacement. By repeating this proce-
dure many times, we obtain an estimate for the MMD value under
H0.
3 METHODOLOGY
Here, we introduce a threat model to characterize the adversaries
our system is facing. We also derive a formal argument justifying
the statistical divergence of adversarial examples from benign train-
ing points. This observation underlies the design of our defensive
mechanisms.
3Other methods have been proposed, such as moment matching Pearson curves. We
focus here on one specific test used in this paper.
3.1 Threat model
Adversarial knowledge—Adversarial example crafting algorithms
proposed in the literature primarily differ in the assumptions they
make about the knowledge available to adversaries [28]. Algorithms
fall in two classes of assumptions: white-box and black-box.
Adversaries operating in the white-box threat model have un-
fettered access to the ML system’s architecture, the value of its
parameters, and its training data. In contrast, other adversaries do
not have access to this information. They operate in a black-box
threat model where they typically can interact with the model only
through an interface analog to a cryptographic oracle: it returns
the label or probability vector output by the model when presented
with an input chosen by the adversary.
In this paper, we are designing a defensive mechanism. As such,
wemust consider the worst-case scenario of the strongest adversary.
We therefore operate in both the white-box and the black-box
threat model. While our attacks may not be practical for certain
ML systems, it allows us to provide stronger defensive guarantees.
Adversarial capabilities—These are only restricted by constraints
on the perturbations introduced to craft adversarial examples from
legitimate inputs. Such constraints vary from dataset to dataset,
and as such we leave their discussion to the description of our setup
in Section 4.
3.2 Statistical Properties of Adversarial
Examples
When learning a classifier from training data as described in Sec-
tion 2, one seeks to learn the real distributions of features DCireal
for each subset Ci corresponding to a class i . These subsets define
a partition of the training data, i.e. ∪iCi = X . However, due to
the limited number of training examples, any machine learning
algorithm will only be able to learn an approximation of this real
distribution, the learned feature distributions DCitrain.
A notable result in ML is that any stable learning algorithms
will learn the real distribution DCireal up to any multiplicative factor
given a sufficient number of training examples drawn fromDCireal [5].
Stability refers here to the fact that given a slight modification of
the data, the resulting classifier and its prediction do not change
much. Coming back to our previous reasoning, however, this full
generalization is in practice impossible due to the finite (and often
small) number of training examples available.
The existence of adversarial examples is a manifestation of
the difference between the real feature distribution DCireal and the
learned feature distribution DCitrain: the adversary follows the strat-
egy of finding a sample drawn from DCireal that does not adhere to
the learned distribution DCitrain. This is only partially dependent on
the actual algorithm used to compute the adversarial example. Yet,
the adversary (or any entity as a matter of fact) does not know
the real feature distribution DCireal (otherwise one could use that
distribution in lieu of the ML model). Therefore, existing crafting
algorithms generate adversarial examples by perturbing legitimate
examples drawn from DCitrain, as discussed in Section 2.2.
Independently of how adversarial examples were generated, all
adversarial examples for a classCi will constitute a new distribution
DCiadv of this class. Following the above arguments, clearly D
Ci
adv is
consistent with DCireal, since each adversarial example for a class Ci
is still a data point that belongs to this class. On the other hand,
however, DCiadv , D
Ci
train. This follows from a reductio ad absurdum:
if the opposite was true, adversarial examples would be correctly
classified by the classifier.
As discussed in Section 2.3, consistent statistical tests can be used
to detect whether two sets or samplesX1 andX2 were sampled from
the same distribution or not. A sufficient (possibly infinite) number
of examples in each sample allows such a consistent statistical test
to detect the difference in the distributions even if the underlying
distributions of X1 and X2 are very similar.
Following from the above, statistical tests are natural candidates
for adversarial example detection. Adversarial examples have to
inherently be distributed differently from legitimate examples used
during training. The difference in distribution should consequently
be detectable by a statistical test. Hence, the first hypothesis we
want to validate or invalidate is the ability of a statistical test to
distinguish between benign and adversarial data points. We have
two practical limitations, one is that we can do so by observing
a finite (and small) number of examples, the second that we are
restricted to existing adversarial example crafting algorithms.
Hypothesis 1. We only need a bounded number of n examples to
observe a measurable difference in the distribution of examples drawn
Dadv and Dtrain using a consistent statistical test T .
We validate this hypothesis in Section 5. We show that as few
as 50 misclassified adversarial examples per class are sufficient to
observe a measurable difference between legitimate trainings points
and adversarial examples for existing adversarial example crafting
algorithms.
3.3 Detecting Adversarial Examples
The main limitation of statistical tests is that they cannot detect
adversarial examples on a per-input basis. Thus, the defender must
be able to collect a sufficiently large batch of adversarial inputs
before it can detect the presence of adversaries. The defender can
uncover the existence of malicious behavior (as would an intrusion
detection system) but cannot identify specific inputs that were
manipulated by the adversary among batches of examples sampled
(the specific intrusion). Indeed, sampling a single example will not
allow us to confidently estimate its distribution with a statistical
test.
This may not be acceptable in security-critical applications. A
statistical test, itself, is therefore not always suitable as a defensive
mechanism.
However, we propose another approach to leverage the fact that
Dadv is different from Dtrain. We augment our learning model with
an additional outlier class Cout. We then train the ML model to
classify adversarial examples in that class. Technically, Cout thus
contains all examples that are not drawn from any of the learned
distributions DCitrain. We seek to show that this augmented classifier
can detect newly crafted adversarial examples at test time.
Hypothesis 2. The augmented classifier with an outlier classCout
successfully detects adversarial examples.
We validate Hypothesis 2 in Section 6. We also address the po-
tential existence of an arms race between attackers and defenders
in Section 7.
4 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We describe here the experimental setup used in Sections 5, 6 and 7
to validate the hypotheses stated in Section 3. Specifically, we design
our setup to answer the following experimental questions:
• Q1: Howwell do statistical tests distinguish adversar-
ial distributions from legitimate ones? In Section 5, we
first find that theMMDand energy distance can statistically
distinguish adversarial examples from legitimate inputs.
Statistical tests can thus be designed based on these metrics
to detect adversarial examples crafted with several known
techniques. In fact, we find that often a sample size of 50
is enough to identify them.
• Q2: Can detection be integrated in ML models to iden-
tify individual adversarial examples? In Section 6, we
show that classifiers trained with an additional outlier class
detects > 80% of the adversarial examples it is presented
with. We also find that in cases where malicious inputs
are undetected, the perturbation introduced to evade the
model needs to be increased by 150%, making the attack
more expensive for attackers.
• Q3: Do our defenses create an arms race? We also find
that our model with an outlier class is robust to adaptive
adversaries, such as the ones using black-box attacks. Even
when such adversaries are capable of closely mimicking
our model to perform a black-box attack, they are still
detected with 60% accuracy in the worst case, and in many
cases with accuracies larger than > 90%.
To answer these questions comprehensively, we use several
datasets, models and adversarial example algorithms in an effort to
represent the ML space. We will introduce them in more detail in
the next section.
4.1 Adversarial example crafting
In our experiments, we consider the following attacks. Before we
describe them, we want to remark that we do not consider func-
tionality or utility of these attacks, in an attempt to study a worst
case scenario.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)—This attack computes the
gradient of the model’s output with respect to its input. It then
perturbs examples in that direction. The computational efficiency
of this attack comes at the expense of it introducing large perturba-
tions that affect the entire input. This attack is not targeted towards
a particular class. We used the initial implementation provided in
the cleverhans v.0.1 library [12] and varied the perturbation in
the experiments.
Jacobian-based Saliency Map Approach (JSMA)—In contrast
to the FGSM, this attack iteratively computes the best feature to
perturb for misclassification as a particular (usually closest) class.
This yields an adversarial example with fewer modified features,
at the expense however of a higher computational cost. We rely
again on the implementation provided in the cleverhans v.1
library [12].
SVM attack— This attack is described in [26]. It targets a linear
SVMby shifting the point orthogonally along the decision boundary.
The result is a perturbation similar to the one found by the FGSM. In
the case of SVMs however, the perturbation depends on the target
class.
Decision Tree (DT) attack— We implemented a variant of the
attack from [26] where we search the shortest path between the leaf
in which the sample is currently at and the closest leaf of another
class. We then perturb the feature that is used in the first common
node shared by the two paths. By repeating this process, we achieve
a misclassification. This attack modifies only few features and is
not targeted.
4.2 Datasets
We evaluate our hypothesis on three datasets.
MNIST—This dataset consists of black-and-white images from 0 to
9 taking real values [19]. It is composed of 60, 000 images, of which
10, 000 form a test dataset. Each image has 28x28 pixels.
DREBIN—This malware dataset contains 545, 333 binary malware
features [2]. To make adversarial example crafting faster, we apply
dimensionality reduction, as done by Grosse et al. [14], to obtain
955 features. The dataset contains 129, 013 Android applications,
of which 123, 453 are benign and 5, 560 are malicious. We split this
dataset randomly in training and test data, where the test data
contains one tenth of all samples.
Due to its binary nature, it is straightforward to detect attacks
like the FGSM or the SVM attack: they lead to non-binary features.
We did, nonetheless, compute them in several settings to investigate
performance of the detection capabilities. We did not restrict the
features that can be perturbed (in contrast to previous work[14])
in an effort to evaluate against stronger adversaries.
MicroRNA—This medical dataset consists of 3966 samples, of
which 1280 are breast cancer serums and the remaining are non-
cancer control serums. We restrict the features to the 5 features
reported as most useful by the original authors [1]. When needed,
we split the dataset randomly in training and test subsets, with a
1/10 ratio. This dataset contains real-valued features, each with
different mean and variance. We computed perturbations (for SVM,
the FGSM and the JSMA) dependent on the variance of the feature
to be perturbed.
4.3 Models
We now describe the details of the models used. These models
were already introduced in Section 2.1, and their implementation
available at URL blinded.
Decision Trees—We use the Gini impurity as the information gain
metric to evaluate the split criterion.
Support Vector Machines—We use a linear multi-class SVM. We
train it with an l2 penalty and the squared hinge loss. When there
are more then two classes, we follow the one-vs-rest strategy.
Neural Networks—For MNIST, the model has two convolutional
layers, with filters of size 5x5, each followed by max pooling. A
fully connected layer with 1024 neurons follows.
The DREBIN model reproduces the one described in [14]. It has
two fully connected layers with 200 neurons each. The network on
the MicroRNA data has a single hidden layer with 4 neurons.
All activation functions are ReLU. All models are further trained
using early stopping and dropout, two common techniques to reg-
ularize the ML model’s parameters and thus improve its gener-
alization capabilities when the model makes predictions on test
data.
Logistic regression—We train a logistic regression on MicroRNA
data with dropout and a cross-entropy loss.
Most of these classifiers achieve accuracy comparable to the
state-of-the art on MNIST4. On DREBIN, the accuracy is larger than
97.5%. On MicroRNA, the neural network and logistic regression
achieve 95% accuracy.
5 IDENTIFYING ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
USING STATISTICAL METRICS AND TESTS
We answer the first question from Section 4: in practice, how well do
statistical tests distinguish adversarial distributions from legitimate
ones? We find that two statistical metrics, the MMD and the energy
distance, both reflect changes—that adversarial examples make to
the underlying statistical properties of the distribution—by often
strong variations of their value. Armed with these metrics, we apply
a statistical test. It detects adversarial examples confidently, even
when presented with small sample sets. This validates Hypothesis 1
from Section 3: adversarial examples exhibit statistical properties
significantly different from legitimate data.
5.1 Characterizing adversarial examples with
statistical metrics
We consider two statistical distance measures commonly used to
compare higher dimensional data: (1) the maximum mean discrep-
ancy, and (2) the energy distance.
MaximumMean Discrepancy (MMD)—Recall from Section 2.3
that this divergence measure is defined as:
MMDb [F ,X1,X2] = sup
f ∈F
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
f (x1i ) − 1
m
m∑
i=1
f (x2i )
)
where x1i ∈ X1 is the i-th data point in the first sample. x2j ∈ X2 is
the j-th data point in the second sample, which is possibly drawn
from another distribution than X1. f ∈ F is a kernel function
chosen to maximize the distances between the samples from the
two distributions. In our case, a Gaussian kernel is used.
Energy distance (ED)—The ED, which is also used to compare the
statistical distance between two distributions, was first introduced
by Szkély et al. [35]. It is a specific case of the maximum mean
discrepancy, where one does not apply any kernel.
Measurement results—We perturb the training distribution of
several MNIST models (a neural network, decision tree, and support
vector machine) using the adversarial example crafting algorithm
presented in Section 4.1 that is suitable for each model. We then
measure the statistical divergence (i.e. the distance) between the
adversarially manipulated training data and the model’s training
data by computing the MMD and ED.
All data points are drawn randomly out of the 60, 000 training
points. The chance of having a particular sample and its modified
4The linear SVM and decision tree only achieve 92.7% and 67.4% on MNIST.
Manipulation Parameters MMD ED
Original - 0.105 130.85
FGSM ε = 0.07 0.281 157.904
FGSM ε = 0.275 0.603 213.967
JSMA - 0.14 137.63
DT attack - 0.1 130.71
SVM attack ϵ = 0.25 0.524 186.32
Flipped - 0.306 135.0
Subsampling 45 pixel 2.159 102.7
Gaussian Blur 4 pixel 1.021 128.52
Table 1: Maximum mean discrepancy (MMD) and energy
distance (ED) between the original distribution and trans-
formed distributions obtained by several adversarial and
geometric techniques on MNIST. Values are averaged over
sets of 1, 000 inputs sampled randomly from the particular
data. For each technique, parameters such as the perturba-
tion magnitude for the FGSM or the number of blurred pix-
els are given. The JSMA leads to a change of on average 20
pixels, whereas the DT attack changes on average 1 pixel.
counterpart in the same batch is thus very small. To give a baseline,
we also provide the distance between the unmodified training and
test distributions. At this point, we do not provide the variances,
since we consider this to be a sanity check for the following steps.
We present the results of our experiments in Table 1.
We observe that for most adversarial examples, there is a strong
increase in values of the MMD and ED. In the case of the FGSM, we
observe that the increase is stronger with larger perturbations ϵ .
For the JSMA and the DT attack, changes are more subtle because
these approaches only modify very few features.
We then manipulate the test data using geometric perturbations.
While these are not adversarial, they are nevertheless helpful to
interpret the magnitude of the statistical divergences. Perturba-
tions considered consist in mirroring the sample, subsampling from
the original values, and introducing Gaussian blur.5 We find that
mirroring and subsampling affect both the MMD and ED, whereas
Gaussian blur only significantly increases the ED.
In this first experiment, we observed that there exists measurable
statistical distances between samples of benign and malicious in-
puts. This justifies the design of consistent statistical tests to detect
adversarial distributions from legitimate ones.
5.2 Detecting adversarial examples using
hypothesis testing
We apply a statistical test to evaluate the following hypothesis: sam-
ples from the test distribution are statistically close to samples from
the training distribution. We expect this hypothesis to be accepted
for samples from the legitimate test distribution, but rejected for
samples containing adversarial examples. Indeed, we observed in
Section 5.1 that adversarial distributions statistically diverge from
the training distribution.
5This geometric perturbation approximates an attack against ML models introduced
by Biggio et al. [4]. Indeed, the adversarial inputs produced by this attack appear as
blurry, with less crisp shapes.
Two-sample hypothesis testing— As stated before, the test we
chose is appropriate to handle high dimensional inputs and small
sample sizes.6 We compute the biased estimate of MMD using a
Gaussian kernel, and then apply 10, 000 bootstrapping iterations
to estimate the distributions. Based on this, we compute the p-
value and compare it to the threshold, in our experiments 0.05. For
samples of legitimate data, the observed p-value should always be
very high, whereas for sample sets containing adversarial examples,
we expect it to be low—since they are sampled from a different
distribution and thus the hypothesis should be rejected.
The test is more likely to detect a difference in two distributions
when it considers samples of large size (i.e., the sample contains
more inputs from the distribution).
Whenever we write confidently detected at sample size x , we
mean that all 200 instances of the test on x randomly sampled ex-
amples from each of the two distributions rejected H0. Percentages
reported correspond to the n times of 200 the test accepted H0.
Results— Regardless of the sample size, the hypothesis acceptance
for benign data generally lies around 95%. This means that the
benign data is confidently identified as such. The sample size (i.e.,
the number of adversarial examples) required to confidently detect
adversarial distributions is given in Table 1a for the three datasets
(MNIST, DREBIN, MicroRNA).
For most datasets and models, a sample size of 50 adversarial
examples is sufficient for the statistical test to reject H0 when com-
paring this sample to a sample from the benign distribution. Thus,
the statistical test identifies adversarial examples with strong confi-
dence, despite having few points of comparison (relatively to the
training set size of 50, 000 for MNIST).
Some exceptions should be noted. A sample of at least 100 inputs
is required to confidently detect adversarial examples crafted with
the JSMA on a neural network. In addition, the test is unable to
detect adversarial examples crafted for MNIST on decision trees.
However, these two observations are consistent with results from
Section 5.1, which showed that these attacks yielded adversarial
inputs with less distinguishable statistical properties than the FGSM
for instance. Another result confirms this explanation: the SVM
attack, which was observed to lead to large changes in the MMD
and energy distance, is as well easily detected by the two-sample
test. A sample of 10 adversarial inputs is sufficient to confidently
reject the H0.
Briefly put, these results support that the distribution of JSMA
or FSGM adversarial examples differs from legitimate inputs, where
we used a statistical hypothesis test on a set of inputs.
5.3 Decreasing sample size by performing
class-wise statistical tests
In an effort to reduce the number of inputs (i.e., the sample size)
required for the statistical test to be confident, we propose here to
refine it. We previously assumed that the dataset was generated by
a single underlying distribution. However, each class of the problem
can be viewed as its own distribution. We thus perform below the
statistical test on samples grouped according to their label. We
separate the inputs according to their original label, or the (wrong)
6We used an implementation publicly available at
https://github.com/emanuele/kernel_two_sample_test.
Dataset FGSM JSMA SVM DT
MNIST 50 (.275) 100 (16) 10 (.25) - (1)
DREBIN 50 (.6) 50 (2) 10 (.25) 50 (2)
Micro 50 (.6) 10 (3) * 50 (1)
(a)Whole datasets. The average adversarial perturbation introduced
is characterized in parenthesis either by stating the perturbation pa-
rameter ϵ (FGSM, SVM attack), or the number of perturbed features
(JSMA, DT attack).
Attack: FGSM JSMA SVM DT
Class: O P O P O P O P
MNIST 50 50 50 100 10 10 50 -
DREBIN (+) 10 10 50 50 10 10 50 -
DREBIN (-) 10 10 50 50 10 10 10 50
Micro (+) 10 10 10 10 * * 10 10
Micro (-) 10 10 10 10 * * 10 50
(b) The statistical test is run either with the original class (O) of the
input or the class predicted by the model to the perturbed input
(P). Upper row for DREBIN refers to malware class (+), second to
benign programs (-). For MicroRNA, (+) are the cancer serum , (-)
is the control group. for MNIST, we report average values over all
classes.
Figure 1: Minimum sample size (i.e., number of adversarial
inputs) needed to confidently detect adversarial examples.
Stars indicate experiments that were not conducted because
the attack failed to succeed (yielding reductions in accuracy
smaller than < 30%) or initial accuracy was too low. In other
cases (-), even a sample size of 500 was not enough to detect
the adversarial examples.
label assigned by the model. These tests are found to be confident
for smaller sample sizes.
Results— Experimental results are given in Table 1b. On MNIST,
we find that these new class-wise statistical tests reduce the sample
size needed to detect the JSMA to 50 examples. This is is also the
case with DREBIN, where the sample size is reduced to 10. For the
MicroRNA we only observe a change in sample size concerning
the decision tree attack, where again confident detection is already
possible at a sample size of 10.
For all datasets, we find that using a statistical test based on
the distribution of the class in which the inputs are (wrongly) mis-
classified is more effective than using the class from which they
were derived: the latter even completely fails for decision trees on
MNIST. These results are consistent across the two other datasets
(DREBIN and MicroRNA). In Figure 2, however, we observe that
on MNIST when testing for the FGSM examples, this tendency is
reversed.
Briefly put, we observed that theminimum sample size to achieve
confident detection with a class-wise test is smaller than the sample
size required by the general statistical test. We also noted that statis-
tical tests comparing adversarial examples with training examples
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Figure 2: Frequency of hypothesis H0 acceptance with re-
spect to the sample size (number of adversarial examples) on
which the statistical test is performed. Lower values indicate
that the hypothesis was rejected in more cases (e.g., the ad-
versarial examples are detected as outside the expected dis-
tribution), which is the defender’s goal. The statistical test
is defined either with the original class of the input (bars
with patterns), or the class predicted by the model on the
perturbed input (plain bars).
from the class they are misclassified as (rather than the class they
were derived from) are more confident.
To close this section, we want to remark that a possible conclu-
sion from the findings in this section is to apply statistical outlier
detection to detect adversarial examples. This yields a model ag-
nostic way to detect adversarial examples. We experimented with
simple outlier detection models and found, however, that many
of them where not able to handle the high dimensional data with
good confidence7. Since the classifiers themselves however can also
be trained to perform outlier detection, we went for the approach
described in the following section.
6 INTEGRATING OUTLIER DETECTION IN
MODELS
In the previous section, we concluded that the distribution of adver-
sarial examples statistically differs from the expected distribution.
Yet, the confidence of the test diminishes with the number of exam-
ples in the sample set analyzed: this test cannot be used to identify
which specific inputs are adversarial among a set of inputs.
In this Section, we provide an answer to our second experimental
question: “Can we detect individual adversarial examples?” Our
approach adds an additional output to the model. The model is
trained to assign this new output class to all adversarial inputs. In
other words, we explicitly train models to label all inputs that are
not part of the expected distribution as part of a new outlier class.
7We used the Two-Sample-Kernel Test with a single sample and Tukey’s test. We
further investigated several threshold/quartile based combinations for a radial, linear,
and Gaussian distances and kernels.
In the following experiments, we show that this approach is com-
plimentary to the statistical test introduced in Section 2.3 because
it enables the defender to accurately identify whether a given input
is adversarial or not.
Intuition— In the previous section, we have shown that the feature
distribution of adversarial examples differs significantly from the
distribution of benign training data. Yet, there exists no real feature
distribution Dreal for adversarial examples: they are instead derived
from the feature distribution of the original classes throughminimal
perturbation based on reconnaissance of the attacked classifier’s
behavior.
In the following, we want to leverage this insight while the clas-
sifier is being trained. Our goal is to be able to detect individual
adversarial examples, as discussed in Section 3. Since the distribu-
tion drift between the training and adversarial test distributions is
detectable, we can hypothesize that it is learnable as well. Assuming
that the classifier generalizes well to adversarial examples it has
not seen during training, this would enable us to detect adversarial
examples.
Training with an outlier class—We start the process by training
an initial model Nin on the original data D = {X ,Y }. We compute
adversarial examples for Nin on the training data, denoted as Xin .
We then train a new model, Np1 on an augmented dataset, X ∪Xin ,
where all adversarial examples are assigned to the outlier class.
In particular, adversarial examples of different crafting algorithms
are in the same class. Specifically, we arrange batches of inputs
analyzed by the learning algorithm such that 2/3 are legitimate
training examples from X and 1/3 are adversarial from Xin .
To evaluate the robustness of this model, we craft adversarial
examples on the test data Dt = {Xt ,Yt } for the augmented model.
In the case of JSMA, the target class will always be selected as the
second most confident class, except this class is the outlier class.
We thus always craft towards the strongest original class. We then
report the misclassification or error on adversarial examples, e.g.
all adversarial examples that were not classified as outliers or as
their original class. Additionally, we report the percentage of all
adversarial examples that were classified as outliers.
Performance impact— In order for the outlier class to be a prac-
tical mechanism for detecting adversarial inputs, the impact on the
model accuracy on benign test data should be limited.
On MNIST, we observe that the parameters of our model aug-
mented with an outlier class converge slightly slower (in terms
of training iterations required) to their final values compared to
an unmodified model. In addition, the model’s accuracy varies be-
tween 98.0% and 98.8% when it is presented with legitimate inputs.
Thus deploying the defense comes at the cost of a decrease from
the original model accuracy of 99.2%.
On DREBIN, the original network achieves an accuracy on the
benign test data of 97.7%. Considering the mean, we observe a
slight decrease of 0.2% in accuracy for the model trained using an
additional class.
On the microRNA data, the original logistic regression achieves
an accuracy around 95.4%. With an outlier class, accuracy drops
to 93.4%. The same holds for neural networks trained on the same
dataset.
Attack ϵ Recovered Detected Error
FGSM 0.2 0.2% 99.78% 0.02%
FGSM 0.28 0.01% 99.91% 0.08%
FGSM 0.3 0.01% 99.93% 0.06%
FGSM 0.4 0% 99.99% 0.01%
FGSM > 0.5 0% 100% 0%
JSMA ≤ 80 0.02% 83.76% 16.22%
Table 2: Adversarial example detection rate for models
trained with an outlier class on MNIST. All models are
trained on ϵ = 0.275 for the FGSM and ϵ ≤ 200 for the JSMA.
The first columns indicate the attack used upon completion
of training and its parameter. Recovered indicates the rate of
adversarial examples classified in the original class of the
input they were crafted from.Detected indicates the percent-
age of adversarial examples that were classified as outliers.
The error rate is simply the remaining adversarial examples
(those not correctly classified or detected as outliers).
Detection results— In this series of experiments, we first measure
the detection performance of the model on malicious examples. We
then study the failure cases of our mechanism on benign data.
Results on MNIST is given in Table 2. A large proportion of
adversarial examples are detected or their original class is recovered
(so they are correctly classified). The outlier class mechanism can
be successfully trained to detect adversarial examples produced by
both the FGSM and JSMA attacks, and we discuss later in Section 7
how it fairs with mixtures of both attacks. Generally speaking, the
detection rate increases with the perturbation magnitude, while
the recovery rate decreases.
We now report the results on the DREBIN dataset. Concerning
the FGSM adversarial examples, we observed, independently from
chosen ϵ , an misclassification around 92.3%. The network could
further not be hardened against those adversarial examples: after
training, the accuracy was still 92.2%. For the JSMA, we observe an
initial misclassification of 99.991% by changing 2.3 features.8 When
retraining on adversarial examples, we do not observe any increase
in robustness. We do observe, however, an increase in the number
of changed features up to 5.8 when trained on JSMA examples.
To understand whether the limited effectiveness of our defense
on DREBIN is a consequence of the binary nature of its data or
the stronger success of the attack, we implemented a second attack
with a worse heuristic that initially modifies 6.6 features on average.
By training on adversarial examples crafted with this defense, it
became impossible to craft adversarial examples using the same
modified JSMA with an upper limit of 90 changed features.
We also trained a simple logistic regression on the MicroRNA
data and trained it on adversarial examples. The results are depicted
in Table 3. We only applied the FGSM, since the JSMA was not suc-
cessful (only 40% of the adversarial examples evaded the model).
Initially, misclassification was 95.7% by applying a perturbation of
ϵ = 1.0. Further increase of ϵ had no effect. Training logistic regres-
sion with an outlier class on adversarial examples given ϵ = 1.0, we
8This initial perturbation is much less then reported in the original work, since we do
not restrict the features as done previously [14].
log reg log reg+1 NN+1
ϵ Accuracy Error Detected Error
0.2 87.4% 3.5% 16.7% 4.5%
0.4 42.9% 5.9% 64.6% 10.4%
0.6 15.9% 32.3% 64.9% 4.5%
0.8 5.1% 69.2% 26.3% 2%
1.0 4.3% 87.2% 6.7% 0.7%
Table 3: Accuracy and detection rate of MicroRNA logistic
regressions (log reg) and neural networks (NN).We present a
baselinemodel and twomodels trainedwith additional class
(+1), both trained on FGSM at ϵ = 1.0 and ϵ = 0.8. Attack
parameter for FGSM is given in the first collum. Error refers
to the percentage of misclassified adversarial examples.
obtain a misclassification of 87.2%. For lower perturbations, we can
decrease misclassification, however. The limited improvement is
most likely due to the limited capacity of logistic regression models,
which prevents them from learning models robust to adversarial
examples [11]. Thus, we trained a neural network on the data. Ini-
tially it could be evaded with the same perturbation magnitude and
success. Yet, when trained with the outlier class, misclassification
was 0.7% on the strongest ϵ .
Wrongly classified benign test data— Next, we investigate the
error cases of our mechanism. The number of false positives, be-
nign test examples of the original data that are wrongly classified
as outliers, represents a small percentage of inputs: e.g., 0.5% on
MNIST. In addition, we draw confusion matrices for the benign
test data in Figure 3. The diagonal indicates correctly classified
examples and is canceled out to better visualize out-of-diagonal
and misclassified inputs. Misclassification between classes is very
similar in the original case and when training with the FGSM. In
the interest of space, we thus omit the confusion matrix for original
data. In contrast, when training on JSMA examples, a large fraction
of misclassified data points is no longer misclassified as a legitimate
class, but wrongly classified as outliers.
7 PREVENTING THE ARMS RACE
A key challenge in ML security lies in the fact that no defense
guarantees resilience to future attack designs. This contrasts with
ML privacy where differential privacy guarantees withstand all
hypothetical adversaries. Such an arms race may only be broken by
mechanisms that have been proven to be secure in an expressive
security model, such as the one of differential privacy.
While providing any formal guarantees for the methods pro-
posed here is intrinsically hard given the nature of optimization
problems solved byML algorithms, we evaluate here their resilience
to adaptive strategies. We first show that the statistical test still
performs well when presented with a mixture of benign and mali-
cious inputs. We then demonstrate the robustness of our models
augmented with the outlier class to powerful black-box strategies
that have evaded previous defenses.
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Figure 3: Confusionmatrices on benign test inputs ofMNIST.
The horizontal axis denotes the original label, and the ver-
tical one the output class of the network. Left side corre-
sponds to training on FGSM examples, right side on JSMA
examples. The diagonal (correctly classified data points) has
been zeroed, indices correspond to MNIST classes, where 10
is the outlier class. Bothmatrices are normalized in the same
scale, i.e., same color means same number of misclassified
samples. Brighter indicates a higher number of misclassi-
fied examples.
7.1 Robustness of the Statistical Test
Though we introduced the statistical not as a defense, but as a tool
to investigate the distribution of adversarial examples, one might
perform it on a batch before submitting inputs to the ML model. A
natural question is then whether an adversary aware of this defense
could evade it by constructing adversarial examples simultaneously
misleading the model and the statistical test.
Theoretically, a statistical test cannot be misled because adver-
sarial examples necessarily deviate from the expected distribution
(see Section 3). Yet, this assumes that the defender is capable of
running statistical tests on sufficiently large sample sets of inputs.
In that case, it is guaranteed that the null hypothesis would be
rejected. However, this may not always be the case in practice as
such sampling may require a potentially infinite number of inputs.
As such, we measure the confidence of our statistical test as it is
presented with more realistic sample sets of inputs in an effort to
demonstrate its robustness.
We consider two scenarios were the attacker adapted its strategy.
First, the attacker might hide small numbers of adversarial examples
among a large number of benign samples. In the following, we thus
investigate the statistical test’s performance in detecting adversarial
inputs in the presence of legitimate inputs. Second, we consider
sample sets of adversarial examples, where the adversary executed
more than one adversarial crafting algorithm, like for instance the
FGSM and the JSMA.
Mixture of adversarial examples—We observe reductions in the
detection confidence for mixtures of adversarial examples. This is in
particular the case when one of the adversarial example kind is hard
to detect. For instance, we observed in Section 5.2 that adversarial
inputs for decision trees are hard to detect on MNIST. This reduces
the performance of the statistical test on samples that contain these
examples. Our full results are depicted in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Evaluating mixtures of different adversarial exam-
ples and benign data. X-axis indicates the percentage of be-
nign data. Y-axis is the percentage where the statistical test
confirms that the data is from the samedistribution (lower is
better). We observe that the more benign examples (moving
to the right), the harder it is to detect the remaining adver-
sarial examples.
Mixtures of adversarial and legitimate inputs—The trade-off
between the ratio of benign and adversarial examples, test con-
fidence and sample size is shown in Figure 4. The test is more
confident when the percentage of adversarial examples is high or
the sample size is large. Hence, one is less likely to detect adver-
sarial examples mixed with legitimate inputs among small sets of
inputs.
We conclude that the statistical test’s confidence decreases, as
expected, when the adversary submits very few adversarial exam-
ples among large sets of legitimate inputs. This is however the
main motivation behind the outlier class mechanism introduced in
Section 6.
7.2 Robustness of the Outlier Class
We now investigate the performance of models augmented with
an outlier class in the face of adversaries aware of that defense.
We first show that these models are able to generalize to varying
attacker strategies, i.e., they can detect adversarial inputs crafted
using a different algorithm than the one used to train the outlier
class.
In addition, we note that in all previous experiments, we con-
sidered adversaries directly computing adversarial examples based
on the defended model’s parameters. Instead, we here evaluate the
model’s robustness when attacked using black-box strategies. These
powerful attacks have been shown to evade previously proposed
defenses, such as adversarial training and defensive distillation [25].
The reason is that these defenses did not actually fix model errors
but rather manipulated the model’s gradients, thus only making it
harder for the adversary to craft adversarial examples when they
are computed directly on the targeted model.
Training Attack
ϵ Attack ϵ R D Error
≤ 200 JSMA 0.1 2.04% 77.16% 20.8%
≤ 200 JSMA 0.275 2.07% 96.6% 2.95%
≤ 200 JSMA 0.4 0.22% 98.45% 1.33%
≤ 200 JSMA 0.6 0.13% 99.58% 0.29%
0.275 FGSM ≤ 80 0% 9.63% 90.37%
Table 4: Misclassification and adaptive detection rate DNN
trained with an outlier class on MNIST. All models are
trained on ϵ = .275 FGSM examples and ϵ < 200 JSMA exam-
ples. The attacks used to evaluate the detection performance
are different from the one used to train the outlier class. Re-
covered (R) indicates the rate of adversarial examples clas-
sified in the original class of the input they were crafted
from.Detected (D) indicates the percentage of adversarial ex-
amples that were classified as outliers. The error rate is sim-
ply the remaining adversarial examples (those not correctly
classified or detected as outliers)
A simple but highly successful strategy is then for the adver-
sary to train an auxiliary model that mimics the defended model’s
predictions, and then use the auxiliary model to find adversarial
examples that are also misclassified by the defended model. In the
following, we show that our models with an outlier class are also
robust to such strategies.
Robustness of detection to adaptive attackers—We investigate
whether the outlier class generalizes to other adversarial example
crafting techniques. In other words, we ask whether defending
against one type of adversarial examples is sufficient to mitigate
an adaptive attacker using multiple techniques to craft adversarial
examples.
We thus trained the MNIST model’s outlier class with only one
kind of adversarial example, and then observed its robustness to
another kind of adversarial examples. Table 4 reports this result for
varying attack parameter intensities. If we train the model on JSMA
adversarial examples, it is also robust to adversarial FGSM examples
crafted. If perturbations are high, misclassification is smaller than
3% percent. The reverse case, however, does not hold: a model
trained on FGSM is only slightly more robust then the original
model.
We did not perform this experiment on DREBIN or MicroRNA
datasets, since we could only apply one attack on each of them.
Robustness of detection to black-box attacks performed us-
ing transferability— We now show that our proposed outlier
class mechanism is robust to an additional attack vector against ML
models: black-box attacks exploiting adversarial example transfer-
ability. These techniques allow an adversary to force a ML model
to misclassify without knowledge of its model parameters (and
sometimes even without knowledge of its training data) by com-
puting adversarial examples on a different model than the one
targeted [11, 25, 34].
In order to simulate theworst-case adversary, we train the substi-
tutemodel fromwhichwewill transfer adversarial examples back to
ϵ Attack R D E
0.1 FGSM 42, 67% 55.72% 1.61%
0.275 FGSM 0% 100% 0%
> 0.4 FGSM 0% 100% 0%
≤ 80 JSMA 0.3% 97% 2.7%
ϵ Attack R D E
0.1 FGSM 17.64% 81.64% 0.72%
0.275 FGSM 0% 99.98% 0.02%
> 0.4 FGSM 0% 100% 0%
≤ 80 JSMA 0.46% 92.85% 6.69%
Table 5: Robustness of aMNISTmodel (with an outlier class)
to black-box attackers. All models are trained on ϵ = .275
FGSM examples and ϵ < 200 JSMA examples. Recovered (R)
indicates the rate of adversarial examples classified in the
original class of the input they were crafted from. Detected
(D) indicates the percentage of adversarial examples that
were classified as outliers. The Error (E) rate is simply the re-
maining adversarial examples (those not correctly classified
or detected as outliers). Above Table show an attacker using
a substitute model without an outlier class. Lower one indi-
cates an attacker using a substitute model with an outlier
class, equivalent to tested model.
the victim model with the same training data than the one used by
the victim. Again, a black-box attack may be possible even without
such knowledge [25]. Yet, this allows us to consider a particularly
strong adversary capable to closely mimic our model. We further
focus on the robustness of our approach to such attacks, rather than
a demonstration of the feasibility of such attacks. We train two sub-
stitute models, one including the outlier class (denoted BB+1) as
does the victim, the other not (BB). We then compute adversarial
examples on the substitute model and evaluate the misclassification
rates of the victim model.
MNIST results— The results on MNIST are given in Table 5. We
observe in both settings high robustness against the adversarial
examples computed using the FSGM. Depending on the setting, we
misclassify not a single of the examples when ϵ > 0.4 for BB+1
and ϵ > 0.275 for BB. We further observe high robustness as well
concerning the adversarial examples computed using JSMA: In the
setting of BB+1, the misclassification is around 6.7%, for BB even
2.7%. In all cases, most of the adversarial examples are classified as
outliers.
DREBIN results— We observe that, though the network is vul-
nerable to direct attacks, it is much more resistant to adversarial
examples crafted on another network. In this setting, we only com-
pute JSMA examples. Given a substitute trained with additional
class, we observe misclassification rates of 35.8%, 47.1% are detected
as outliers. For JSMA examples crafted on the original network 0.8%
are misclassified; 98.6% of adversarial examples are classified as
outliers.
MicroRNA results— The results on the MicroRNA data are de-
picted in Table 6. We observe that logistic regression works well
in detecting smaller perturbations till 0.4. For larger ϵ , however,
the misclassification drastically increases, partially to 88%. Again,
we assign the small improvement to the limited capacity of logistic
regression, we trained additionally neural networks. We observed
lower misclassification in settings where the perturbation is max-
immal (ϵ = 1.0). In general, we observe that logistic regression is
more robust in the BB setting, whereas neural networks are more
robust in the BB+1 setting (both with some exceptions).
8 DISCUSSION
We discuss the limitations of the mechanisms proposed to detect
adversarial examples: statistical testing, and an outlier class. We
also explore avenues for future work.
Statistical Test— As we have seen, one of the major strengths of
kernel-based statistical tests is that they operate and thus detect the
presence of adversarial examples already in feature space, before
these inputs are even fed to the ML model. Intuitively, we observed
that the larger the perturbation applied is, the more likely it is to
be confidently detected by the statistical test. Adversarial example
crafting techniques that modify few features (like the JSMA or the
decision tree attack) or perturb the features only slightly (small
values of ϵ for the FGSM) are less likely to be detected.
This finding is consistent with the underlying stationary assump-
tion made by all ML approaches. Since adversarial examples are not
drawn from the same distribution than benign data, the classifier
is incapable of classifying them correctly. This property also holds
for the training data itself, and as such, we expect it to generalize
to poisoning attacks. In such attacks, the adversary attempts to de-
grade learning by inserting malicious points in the model’s training
data. This is however outside the scope of this work, and we leave
this question to future work.
Integrating Outlier Detection—We further observe that adding
an outlier class to the model yields robustness to adaptive attack
strategies, and needed perturbation is increased. Concerning JSMA,
for some datasets, we do not achieve robustness to adversarial
examples. This most likely depends on the initial vulnerability of
the data: For DREBIN we changed barely more than one feature,
for MNIST almost twenty. At the same time, MNIST has slightly
less features, of which the pixels at the borders are barely used.
Thus, having less features and a higher perturbation to learn from
might yield larger robustness to adversarial examples. Additionally,
further factors might include inter-class and intra-class distances,
or the variability of the computed adversarial examples.
Further, the confusion matrices from Figure 3 seem to suggest
that FGSM lie in a different halfspace than the original data: the
outlier class trained on JSMA examples contains benign data points
whereas the FGSM one does not. This might indicate that JSMA
examples lie rather between benign classes.
We further observed that knowledge about the attack is not nec-
essarily needed: training on adversarial examples computed using
the JSMA hardens against computing FGSM examples. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, this does not hold the other way around. In general, since
FGSM is non-targeted and less optimal than JSMA, further work
is needed whether the outlier class generalizes from targeted to
non-targeted attacks or from more optimal to less optimal attacks.
In theory, we could feed samples from the whole feature space
BB BB+1
logistic regression neural network logistic regression neural network
ϵ R D E R D E R D E R D E
0.2 84.6% 11.9% 3.5% 83.6% 12.9% 3.5% 81.3% 14.9% 3.8% 80.8% 15.7% 3.5%
0.4 49, 7% 46.7% 3.6% 47.7% 48.7% 3.6% 35.1% 59.8% 5.1% 27.8% 65.2% 5%
0.6 21.5% 74.7% 3.8% 15.4% 80.6% 4% 9% 74.5% 16.5% 4.5% 68.9% 26.6%
0.8 14.8% 75.3% 9.8% 7.3% 81.8% 10.9% 6% 55.8% 38.2% 4% 30.8% 65.2%
1.0 9.3% 68.2% 22.5% 3.8% 65.4% 30.8% 4.3% 38.6% 57.1% 6% 6.0% 88%
0.2 83.3% 13.9% 2.8% 82.6% 14.6% 2.8% 76.3% 21.5% 2.2% 84.1% 12.1% 3.8%
0.4 45.2% 54.0% 1.8% 42.9% 55.3% 1.8% 30.3% 68.4% 1.3% 50.3% 45.7% 4%
0.6 23.4% 76.0% 10.6% 16.5% 78.3 % 5% 4% 93.2% 2.8% 14.6% 81.6% 3.8%
0.8 13.4% 76% 10.6% 6% 80.3% 13.7% 2% 94.2% 3.8% 3.2% 95.0% 1.8%
1.0 3% 79.8% 17.2% 2% 73.2% 24.8% 2% 94.7% 3.3% 2% 97.2% 0.8%
Table 6: Black box setting for logistic regression (upper part) and a neural network (lower part) on the MicroRNA data trained
using the outlier class. Substitutes are logistic regression or a neural network (NN), either trained without (BB) or with an
additional class (BB+1). If an outlier class is used, FGSM examples at ϵ = 1.0 and ϵ = 0.8 are used for training. We report
parameters of attack (ϵ). Recovered (R) indicates the rate of adversarial examples classified in the original class of the input
they were crafted from. Detected (D) indicates the percentage of adversarial examples that were classified as outliers. The
Error(E) rate is simply the remaining adversarial examples (those not correctly classified or detected as outliers) .
except the location of the classes, and thus obtain a robust classi-
fier without any assumption on the adversary. This is practically
infeasible, however. Future work will investigate trade-offs here.
Finally, we want to remark that the benign data, that is labeled
as outlier by the network might be beneficial when investigated by
an expert[23]. This data might be either excluded from training, or
relabeled. This question will be answered in future work.
9 RELATEDWORK
Other approaches to detect malicious data points by statistical
means have been proposed. However, they all depend on some of
the internal activations of deep neural networks models [20, 30, 32].
Hence, these approaches only apply to the specific classifier studied.
In contrast, we apply our statistical test directly in feature space,
allowing us to propose a model-agnostic detection.
Wang et al. [36] present a similar formal intuition as we do (using
an oracle instead of the underlying distribution, though). From this,
they formally derive conditions when a classifier is secured against
adversarial examples. Further, they proposed a modified version of
adversarial training, originally introduced by Goodfellow et al. [11].
In contrast to both of these approaches, we classify adversarial
examples in a separate (and additional) outlier class. We also do
not compute adversarial examples throughout training but rather
use adversarial examples precomputed on a different model before
training.
Nguyen et al [24] have introduced an outlier class before. Also
Bendale et al [3] propse open networks, that are not confident in
their classification all over the feature space. Both, however, do not
evaluate and motivate their approach in adversarial settings.
Metzen et al. [18] augment neural networks with an auxiliary
network used to detect malicious samples. This additional network
shares some of its parameters with the original one, and thus also
depends on the features of the network. Further, our outlier class
mechanism is applicable to any ML models. In addition, their ap-
proach is limited in settings where the adversary adapts its strategy.
Instead, our experiments systematically explore the space of ad-
versaries (with different adversarial example crafting algorithms,
datasets and models). We also present a detailed discussion of possi-
ble adaptive strategies, such as powerful black-box attacks known
to be hard to defend against [25].
10 CONCLUSION
We empirically validated the hypothesis that adversarial examples
can be detected using statistical tests before they are even fed to
the ML model as inputs. Thus, their malicious properties are model-
agnostic.
Furthermore, we show how to augment ML models with an addi-
tional class in which the model is trained to classify all adversarial
inputs. This results in robustness to adversaries, even those using
attack strategies based on transferability—a class of attacks known
to be harder to defend against than gradient-based strategies. In
addition, when adversarial examples with small perturbations are
not detected as outliers, they are original class is often recovered
and the perturbed input correctly classified.
Additionally, we expect that combining our approaches together,
as well as with other defenses may prove beneficial. For instance,
we expect defensive distillation and the statistical test or outlier
class to work well together, as defensive distillation has been found
to increase the perturbations that an adversary introduces.
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